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MOORGATE: “IF THERE’S A HELL, 
I’VE LIVED TO SEE IT.”
by Peter J Davis
Introduction
At 8:46am on Friday 28 February 1975 a 
London Transport Northern Line (Highbury 
Branch) train – number 272 – carrying 
around 300 passengers ploughed through 
a sand-drag inside a 66’9”-long terminal 
tunnel at the end of Platform 9 at Moorgate 
Underground station.  It demolished a 
substantial buffer installation and crashed 
into a solid 5’-thick concrete wall.
The lights inside the six-coach train and 
on the platform immediately went out.
The recommended speed on approaching 
the station was 15 miles per hour (mph) 
and driver Leslie Newson – known amongst 
his colleagues to be naturally cautious in 
his driving habits – had the usual practice 
of slowing down early when approaching 
a station and letting the train coast into 
position at the platform.  However, on 
this occasion the train was travelling at 
an estimated 35 mph and appeared to be 
accelerating.  When the first rescuers reached 
the platform it appeared to them that a four-
car train had entered the tunnel and that 
the leading coach (later to be established 
as the third coach) had simply run into 
the disused single hydraulic buffer located 
some short distance within the tunnel itself.  
However, it soon became apparent that the 
first two and half coaches had crumpled to 
half their length within the short dead-
end overrun tunnel (see Figs. 1 and 2).
The Tube driver’s cabin – normally about 
three feet from front to rear – was crushed 
to a depth of between six and 12 inches 
against the concrete end wall at ceiling 
height.  The first coach was bent into a 
shape like a large hockey stick with its first 
section (approximately 17’ long) dipping 
downwards from the roof to the tunnel floor 
and the remaining two sections forming the 
handle of the hockey stick as they climbed 
back to the ceiling of the tunnel.  Lethally, 
the coach jack-knifed at the bend of the 
‘hockey stick’.  The first section of the second 
coach was rammed directly beneath the 
On Friday 28 February 1975, the world-famous London Underground suffered an 
horrendous disaster when a Tube train failed to stop at the end of the line and smashed 
into a dead-end tunnel at Moorgate.  Forty-three people died as a result of the 
incident and a further 72 passengers received injuries requiring hospital treatment.
Over the next six days, a huge multi-agency rescue and recovery operation 
took place in extremely demanding circumstances.  Confined spaces, decaying 
bodies, a lack of ventilation, dangerous working conditions, high temperatures 
and foul air all contributed to an operating environment which led one doctor 
working at the scene to comment: “If there’s a hell, I’ve lived to see it.”
It is now over 45 years since the disaster and many theories for the cause of the crash 
have been suggested.  It is highly likely that with the passage of time, the definitive 
answer will never be known and it will simply remain one of life’s mysteries.  However, 
the disaster remains a classic case study of major incident response and here the author 
reflects on several weeks of fascinating research – including trawling the archives and 
speaking directly to several people who responded to the scene – to present an overview 
of the incident, some of the suggested causes and the important lessons to be learned.
sloping rear two sections of the first coach 
and the rear bogey and chassis of the first 
coach bulldozed through the front section 
of the second coach, from floor to ceiling 
level, with devastating results.  The roof 
of the front section of the second coach 
was skimmed back over the rear end of 
the first coach and effectively blocked 
the tunnel from track to ceiling level.
The front of the third coach mounted 
the rear of the second coach and was 
rammed hard against the ceiling of 
the tunnel approximately 15’ inside 
Fig. 1: The Moorgate disaster: Paul Darton, medical illustrator at St Bartholomew’s Hospital, worked on the site during the rescue operation 
to draw this unique record of precisely how two-and-a-half carriages were crumpled into the dead-end tunnel.
the opening.  This resulted in the part 
of the third coach still accessible from 
the platform being at an angle of 15-
20° from the horizontal (see Fig. 3).
One hundred and eighteen feet 
of train had become compressed 
into just over 66’ of tunnel.
Forty-three people lost their lives as a result 
of the incident and 82 passengers received 
injuries of varying severity including chest, 
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Fig. 2: Artist’s impression of the surface and underground operations at Moorgate.
Fig. 3: This image from Platform 9 shows the 15-20° upward incline of the third coach which partially came 
to rest within the 66’ dead-end tunnel. Image © Alamy, reproduced under license (ref: OY31312461)
head and facial, abdominal, musculoskeletal 
and soft-tissue injuries.  Reports indicate 
that the initial management of the 
casualties was aided by two factors: firstly, 
enough staff were available at each of the 
three hospitals which received casualties 
from the incident (St. Bartholomew’s, 
The London and Guy’s); and secondly, the 
casualties arrived at a rate that did not 
overwhelm the available resources. 
The London Ambulance Service (LAS) 
reported its casualty evacuation on the 
day of the disaster as per Table 1 below:
The six-day rescue operation involved 
1324 firefighters, 240 police officers, 80 
ambulance staff, 16 doctors and numerous 
Table 1: LAS casualty evacuation from the Moorgate disaster on Friday 28 February 1975
Time interval Casualties conveyed to hospital Dead
9:00am – 10:00am 32 -
10:00am – 11:00am 6 1
11:00am – 12:00 noon 24 2
12:00 noon – 10:05pm* 13 14
Total: 75 17
(with 24 further dead being recovered over the 
next five days and two later dying in hospital)
* After the removal of the last casualty at 10:05pm (Jeff Benton, who was released at 9:57pm and then 
taken to the surface before removal to hospital) no further live casualties were found.
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voluntary workers and helpers.  The last 
body to be recovered at 8:03pm on Tuesday 
4 March 1975 was that of the driver – or 
‘motorman’ – Leslie Newson, a 56-year 
old husband and father of two children.
Potential causes and contributory 
factors
Mystery has surrounded the cause of the 
accident and to this day no-one has been 
able to provide a conclusive explanation as 
to why it happened.  However unpalatable 
it may be, the reality is that – over 40 
years later – the actual cause will probably 
never be definitively established.
Brake (or other mechanical) failure
The official Department of the Environment 
inquiry into the accident revealed that the 
train was old, dating from 1938, but that 
it – and the braking system – were all in 
good working order.  Lt Col Ian McNaughton 
concluded that “… there was no fault or 
condition of the train involved in this 
accident which would have prevented 
Motorman Newson making a normal, 
controlled approach to Moorgate and 
stopping correctly in the platform.”  Having 
ruled out mechanical failure, he went on 
to conclude that “the accident was solely 
due to a lapse on the part of the driver” 
and that “Newson was conscious up to 
the moment of collision and that he made 
no effort of any kind to stop the train.”
Interviewed for an episode of the television 
documentary Disaster Terry Lowe, a London 
Transport investigator who worked on 
establishing the cause of the incident in the 
weeks which followed, confirmed that they 
could find no rational explanation for the 
crash.  In particular, he detailed three critical 
conclusions in respect of the rolling stock:
•  firstly, that the investigators could 
find nothing wrong with any of the 
braking equipment which adversely 
affected the train’s performance;
15 Plan Moorgate Station.
Simpson also confirmed that he had made a 
particular examination of the possibility of 
electrical injury, but that he had found no 
mark of electrical burn or electrical pattern 
anywhere on the body, nor was there any 
sign of electrical injury to the clothing.
In trying to establish a possible cause Dr 
Phillip A B Raffle, Chief Medical Officer of 
London Transport, suggested two little-known 
conditions which could, in his view, explain 
Leslie Newson’s actions – but admitted that 
there was no evidence to support them.
The first, akinetic mutism, is almost like 
an electrical storm inside the brain and 
causes a person to freeze in such a way that 
their muscle tone would not be affected, 
thus leaving them sitting up and, in the 
case of the Moorgate disaster, depressing 
the deadman’s handle.  Such a condition 
could only be diagnosed by microscopic 
examination of the brain and that was 
not possible owing to its condition.
The second possibility was transient global 
amnesia, a condition in which the blood 
supply to the temporal lobe (at the front of 
the brain and controlling memory) is cut off 
but, in the case of Moorgate, would not have 
otherwise affected Newson’s physical ability 
to drive a train.  This condition would leave 
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• secondly, that the control 
equipment in the driver’s cab was 
in perfect working order; and
• thirdly – and probably most importantly 
– that there had been no attempt 
whatsoever to apply the brakes 
and, in the investigators’ view, the 
train was still motoring and under 
power at the moment of impact.
Possible medical impairments or 
conditions
The post mortem examination of Leslie 
Newson found the cause of death to be 
shock from multiple injuries and Prof Keith 
Simpson (Professor Emeritus at the University 
of London and Head of the Department 
of Forensic Medicine at Guy’s Hospital) 
reported that the deceased appeared to 
have been a perfectly healthy man.  In 
particular, he found no brain disease and 
nothing to suggest that a seizure of any 
kind had been likely or had taken place; 
there was no coronary thrombosis or other 
abnormality of the heart; the lungs were 
healthy; there was no undissolved drug or 
poison matter in the stomach and no smell 
of alcoholic drink, and the liver showed no 
indication of heavy drinking habits.  Prof 
Fig. 4 (top and above left): The intervention organisation established at platform level during the rescue of live casualties; and (above 
right) at 5:00am on Sunday 2 March 1975, the Site Medical Officer – acting on the advice of the City of London’s Public Health Department 
– required all rescue staff working in the wreckage to have an anti-tetanus injection to be administered by a doctor.
no trace whatsoever at post mortem but, 
since it would not have prevented normal 
muscular movement, Dr Raffle said that 
he would have expected Newson to have 
raised his hands in a last moment attempt 
to protect his face.  In his view, the absence 
of such a gesture was one of the most 
inexplicable things of the whole incident.
In more recent commentary Dr Peter Fenwick, 
a neuropsychiatrist and neurophysiologist 
from Kings College, London suggested that 
– in his view – the most likely explanation 
for the driver’s behaviour that morning was 
a temporal lobe seizure, a condition in which 
an epileptic fit passes through the temporal 
lobe of the brain.  In that condition, the 
affected person would again retain their 
body posture and become quite out of 
touch with their surroundings, which would 
explain the testimony of eye-witnesses who 
observed Newson in his cab as he drove the 
train at speed through Platform 9 just before 
the impact.  Anthony Board, a member of 
the public standing on Platform 9 at the 
time of the disaster, said in his statement 
to the British Transport Police that:
“… my attention was drawn to the driver.  
The first thing I observed he was sitting 
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upright and he was wearing a cap, uniform 
style.  I observed his hands were visible and 
in the operating position and it appeared 
that his right hand was on the dead 
man handle.  The driver was completely 
motionless and he was in no way struggling 
with any controls.  He appeared to me 
to be totally transfixed or petrified, but I 
have never before seen any person in such 
a situation and immediately thought he 
had been paralysed by an electric shock.  
A thing that particularly struck was the 
driver’s staring eyes, they appeared to be 
larger than life.  His eyes were completely 
still and looking straight ahead and gave 
me the impression of a determined look.”
Richard M Jones suggests another possible 
explanation in his book published in 2015.  
On 21 June 1974, Les Newson was assaulted 
by a passenger who hit him several times 
around the head causing cuts and bruises 
to the right side of his face.  He was 
later checked out at hospital and given 
the all clear but, because he hadn’t lost 
consciousness, it was apparently decided 
that there was no real cause for concern.  
Advances in medical knowledge since the 
1970s and further research into epilepsy 
suggest that more damage was perhaps done 
to Newson’s brain than was appreciated 
at the time.  The Epilepsy Society provides 
details of a type of fit known as a dissociative 
seizure for which the cause can be hard 
to find (but includes previous traumatic 
events) and for some a delayed onset may 
mean that episodes do not start until years 
after the causal event.  Could this be the 
cause of the driver’s apparent incapacity? 
Whatever the answer, if a neurological 
condition was indeed the cause of the 
Moorgate disaster then it would had to 
have been something which had a very 
rapid and debilitating onset in the 60 
seconds or so between the apparently 
normal departure from the preceding 
station at Old Street and the arrival of train 
272 at Moorgate at 8:46am (see Fig. 5).
Much was made in both the Coroner’s 
inquests and the official government inquiry 
of the elevated blood alcohol levels found 
in Newson’s body.  After being trapped 
in the motorman’s cab since the moment 
of impact on Friday 28 February until 
being brought to the surface at 8:03pm 
on Tuesday 4 March 1975, subsequent 
toxicology reports revealed that Newson 
had alcohol concentrations ranging from 
4.4 to 17.4 mmol/l (20 to 80mg/100ml) 
in four separate blood samples, reflecting 
the erratic nature of the phenomenon of 
post mortem blood alcohol production.
At the inquest into Leslie Newson’s death 
held by Dr David Paul, HM Coroner for the 
City of London, Dr Anne Robinson (Senior 
Lecturer in Forensic Medicine at the London 
Hospital Medical College) gave detailed 
evidence of her examination of the samples 
taken from Newson’s body by Prof James 
Cameron (who assisted Prof Simpson at the 
autopsy).  As a check, she also undertook 
tests on specimens taken from eight of 
the passengers killed in the accident 
whose bodies had been exposed to similar 
conditions for similar lengths of time to that 
of the driver.  In her view, the bacterial and 
yeast content of the specimens was not, 
in any of the cases examined, such that it 
would have caused any significant formation 
of alcohol by fermentation (or otherwise).  
As a result, Robinson reached her highly 
contentious conclusion that Newson had 
drunk alcohol on the morning of this death.
An alternative view of the significance of 
the alcohol levels found by Dr Robinson – in 
particular as to whether the alcohol was 
present at the time of death or formed 
subsequently – was taken by Dr Roy 
Goulding, Director of the Poisons Unit at 
Guy’s Hospital.  Though he accepted the 
numerical results of Dr Robinson’s analyses he 
concluded that, on the information available, 
he could not come to the inescapable 
conclusion that alcohol had been present 
in Motorman Newson’s body prior to death.  
Equally, he could not unequivocally state that 
no alcohol at all had been consumed before 
death but, if any had been consumed, then 
it must have been a very small amount.
More recently, Pounder suggested that 
although the technical aspects of measuring 
ethanol in body fluids are much the same in 
the living and the dead, the interpretation 
of results obtained from autopsy samples 
Fig. 5: At the time of the Moorgate Tube disaster, Platforms 9 and 10 formed the southern terminal of 
the Highbury Branch line.  By the time the official inquiry report was published on 4 March 1976, London 
Transport services had been withdrawn from the Highbury Branch which had been handed over to the Eastern 
Region of British Railways to form the City terminal to the Great Northern suburban electric services.
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is confounded by several problems.  
Distinguishing between alcohol ingestion in 
life and microbial production after death is 
a common problem and one which was to 
prove crucial to the Moorgate investigation.  
Within a few hours of death, gut bacteria 
penetrate the portal venous system and, after 
about six hours, contaminate the systemic 
vessels.  In the blood, glucose and lactate 
provide the substrates for microbial ethanol 
production by a pathway opposite to that 
of its catabolism in the living body.  High 
environmental temperatures after death 
(which, in the case of Moorgate, reached 
in excess of 120oF within the first hour of 
operations on the first day and continued 
to provide a significant challenge during 
the entire rescue and recovery operation), 
abdominal trauma and severe trauma 
with wound contamination all provide 
particularly fertile conditions for ethanol 
synthesis and disruption of the body of 
a severity similar to that seen in the case 
of Motorman Newson carries a high risk 
of post mortem alcohol production.
Daydreaming?
Other London Underground train drivers 
have suggested that Newson could have 
simply been daydreaming and either forgot 
where he was on the line or somehow 
forgot to apply the brakes.  Apparently, 
such possibilities are not as far-fetched as 
they might seem to the layman.  One Tube 
driver commenting on an online thread 
regarding the Moorgate disaster wrote:
“Most likely, he ran out of railway.  It nearly 
happened to me twice.  I got halfway into 
the platform before realising I had forgotten 
to start braking.  On the first occasion, I 
was at Preston Road on the down slow and 
realised I was never going to stop.  It was 
dark and wet and I knew I’d never be able to 
stop in the platform.  I just carried on.  My 
guard yelled down the phone at me: “Are 
you going to stop at Northwick Park?” “Oh 
well yeah, okay – might as well,” I replied 
as nonchalantly as possible, knowing he 
was getting a whole load of flak from the 
punters, since the exit at Preston Road is 
at the rear of the train and it was 17:30.
“As soon as I heard about Moorgate 
I thought: “Poor b*****d ran out of 
railway.  He forgot to stop and thought 
he could carry on to the next station”.”
On the other hand, if Newson had simply 
been daydreaming then it would be 
reasonable to assume that the jolting of the 
train running at speed over the crossover just 
before entry into Platform 9 (along with the 
approaching station lights, see Fig. 6) would 
have roused him from his trance.  Equally, 
even if there was a combination of forgetting 
where he was on the line, overrunning the 
platform by mistake and simply thinking he 
had no option but to continue on to the next 
station (which, of course, didn’t exist) then it 
would be reasonable to assume that running 
into the sand-drag and then hitting the 
hydraulic buffer would have caused at least 
some reaction, however small – including, 
perhaps, the release of the deadman’s handle 
and some instinctive reaction to protect 
himself against the imminent impact.
Fig. 6: View into Platform 9 at Moorgate from the southbound running tunnel which clearly shows the crossover 
which would have been traversed at about 35mph. Entry to Platform 10 is via the left hand tunnel.
Suicide?
Several points were highlighted at the 
inquest to suggest that suicide was not a 
likely cause.  The previous day Newson had 
asked his wife to withdraw some money with 
which he planned to buy his daughter a car 
– not, it was argued, the actions of someone 
intent on suicide.  Other indicators included 
future plans for a holiday in America, the 
planned purchase of a new camera and, 
as noted in Lt Col McNaughton’s official 
report, the fact that none of his colleagues 
had noticed anything out of the ordinary in 
Newson’s behaviour that morning.  Indeed, 
Motorman C. A. Gladding had recalled asking 
Newson for some sugar for his tea that 
morning to which Leslie replied: “Go easy 
with it, I shall want another cup when I come 
off duty.”  Others queried why someone so 
seemingly conscientious and clearly proud 
of being a London Tube driver would want 
to die in such a way that others would 
subsequently form an immortal impression 
that he was quite the opposite, and that in 
general he simply had “too much to live for” 
including the recent birth of his grandson.
Conversely, some argued that Newson’s 
deafness and reported impotence masked 
a deeper depressive illness.  In the inquest 
into the Moorgate deaths, Guard Robert 
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Harris stated that Newson had ominously 
overshot at another station the week 
before the disaster with American suicide 
expert Dr Bruce Danto later suggesting: 
“That doesn’t sound like misjudgement to 
me.  That sounds like a man who’s getting 
used to the feeling of how to run a train 
into a wall.”  Quite how that extrapolated 
conclusion is reached is far from clear.
In a television interview for the Discovery 
Channel’s Disaster series, Richard Hope of the 
Railway Gazette noted: “This would not have 
been just an ‘ordinary’ suicide – it would’ve 
been an act of revenge against society at 
large. It could only have been undertaken 
by somebody who was nursing some terrible 
secret grudge and wanted to take as many 
other people to their deaths with him at the 
same time as he committed suicide.  That, 
of course, is a very unusual state of mind 
indeed and there was no evidence of that 
at all.”  Psychologist Dr Richard Fox has also 
commented that “… suicides rarely, if ever, 
take others with them” although of course 
the more recent example of Germanwings 
co-pilot Andreas Lubitz (who deliberately 
crashed his Airbus A320 in the Alps in 
March 2015 killing himself and 149 other 
people) demonstrates that these events can 
– and do – occur, however infrequently.
The verdict returned by the inquest was 
‘accidental death’, both in respect of 
Motorman Newson and all 42 passengers who 
lost their lives.  However, in his television 
documentary Me, My Dad and Moorgate 
Laurence Marks recalls a discussion he had 
with HM Coroner for the City of London 
during the course of his research for an 
investigative feature he was writing for The 
Sunday Times in which Dr Paul is said to have 
commented: “Between you and me, I don’t 
think it was accidental death.  It is my belief, 
Laurence, that is was suicide – but I can’t 
direct a jury towards suicide unless there 
is a note.  But I would move along those 
lines in your investigation if I were you.”
Delayed memorialisation
Interestingly, there was no memorial to the 
victims of the Moorgate disaster until the 
first of two plaques was unveiled in Finsbury 
Square on 28 July 2013.  It was the result of 
a campaign spearheaded by Richard M Jones, 
author of End of the Line: The Moorgate 
Disaster, who raised money for the memorial 
and secured the space on which it stands 
just a few hundred yards from Moorgate 
Underground station and a few feet from the 
City of London border (see Fig. 7, left).
Just a few months later, London Underground 
also announced plans to erect their own 
memorial at the station itself which was 
unveiled on 28 February 2014 (see Fig. 7, 
right).  For many years, London Underground 
had refused to erect such a memorial, arguing 
that “If we put one up for Moorgate then 
we would have to put one up for everybody 
who had died on the Underground.”  Of 
course, several memorials already exist for 
other tragic events including the King’s 
Cross fire in 1987, the terrorist atrocities 
on 7 July 2005 and several other wartime 
tragedies including Bethnal Green and 
Balham.  Jones suggests that the company’s 
change of mind was ultimately down to 
Tony Hall, one of London Underground’s own 
employees, whose own sister Theresa was 
herself one of the victims of the disaster.
Fig. 7: (left)The memorial dedicated to the memory of the 43 people killed in the Moorgate disaster; and (right) 
the memorial plaque installed by London Underground outside Moorgate station.
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Lessons learned
In his report produced on behalf of the 
City of London Police, Chief Inspector 
Brian Fisher noted that “… in spite of 
extensive pre-planning for major incident 
intervention, the situation at Moorgate 
posed an unforeseen event for the force.  
However, plans had deliberately been kept 
simple and capable of adaptation by the 
police officer-in-charge to suit any situation 
with which they are faced.  This incident 
showed the value of such simple plans.”
Table 2: Lessons learnt by the police as a result of the Moorgate disaster (Fisher, 1975)
Lessons Learned Remarks
1. In spite of extensive pre-planning for major incident 
intervention, the situation posed by this incident had not 
been foreseen.  Plans had, however, deliberately been kept 
simple and capable of adaptation by the police officer in 
charge to suit any situation with which [they] were faced.  
This incident clearly showed the value of such simple plans.
No plan will ever cater for all eventualities and the value 
of keeping them simple and generically applicable to the 
individual demands of any incident has long been recognised.
2. If control and co-ordination at an incident are to be 
established effectively, all necessary control systems 
must be despatched to the scene immediately so 
that they become available to the Police Incident 
Officer from the earliest possible time.
Again, the background of today’s Joint Emergency Services’ 
Interoperability Principles (JESIP) can be seen in the lessons of 
the past – for example, the famous image of the street scene 
outside Moorgate station (Fig. 8, left) shows the co-location of 
the emergency services and other supporting agencies together 
with the effective use of identifying tabards (Fig. 8, right).
3. Ideally, each service should appoint a quartermaster for 
ensuring adequate supplies of back-up equipment.  The 
police are probably the best service to act as quartermaster 
for supplies required by any service which they cannot 
obtain from their own resources, thus avoiding any 
duplication of effort.  To effectively perform this task police 
plans must include a continually updated list of agencies 
capable of providing specialist services or equipment.
It is interesting to note that this is almost an exact repetition of 
the recommendation made in the aftermath of the 1966 Aberfan 
disaster (which was remembered in the Winter 2019 edition of Alert).
4. Police plans should include a scheme for the 
reallocation of duties at the time of a major 
incident.  Planning should allow for non-essential 
police tasks to be curtailed and for pre-trained staff 
to be allocated to pre-determined specialist duties 
in connection with a major incident situation.
The re-distribution of staff to other duties during a major 
incident is now common practice and features in virtually all 
police major incident plans – for example, staff allocated to 
the Casualty Bureau, ante- and post-mortem teams, hospital 
liaison, work at the temporary mortuary and so on.
Fisher went on to draw out the 
following lessons from the multi-
agency response to Moorgate:
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Lessons Learned Remarks
5. The rapid co-ordination of various intervention services and 
organisations can be greatly enhanced by the meeting of 
senior officers of those services / organisations during the 
pre-planning process, thereby enabling a direct personal 
approach to co-ordination being achieved at the incident.
The importance of personal connections and ‘making your friends 
before you need them’ have long been recognised by anyone 
involved in major incident planning and response.  The value of 
trusted relationships forged as part of ‘business as usual’ ahead of 
any incident was exemplified by a comment made by Dr Ken Hines 
to the author in the preparation of this article.  Referring to C/Insp. 
Brian (‘Bud’) Fisher from the City of London Police, Dr Hines said:
“Of course I knew Bud Fisher already – he used to attend 
some of our (North East London Accident) unit meetings 
so when I arrived at Moorgate we could greet each other 
by our first names.  The trust was already there.”
6. The immediate availability of field telephone 
communication facilities and pre-planned 
emergency Post Office communication arrangements 
will ensure a positive line of communication 
from an early time following an incident.
Moorgate not only presented challenges in terms of technical 
communications (solved in part by the use of the experimental 
‘Figaro’ radio communications on trial with the London Fire 
Brigade at the time) but also provided some interesting 
lessons in verbal communication.  The incident produced a 
well-known example where the instructions given over the 
radio from the scene of operations within the tunnel back to 
medical services at street level apparently converted the word 
“Entonox” to “empty box” but whether this actually happened 
or is simply an enduring urban myth is open to some debate.,
7. Intervention planning must accept and allow for the 
natural human reactions of police officers.  Police officers 
first on the scene will become involved in rescue of 
casualties.  Plans must therefore provide for the subsequent 
withdrawal from such automatic activity as soon as the 
accepted rescue services are present in sufficient numbers.
The first duty of all the emergency services is the saving of life.  
Individuals’ basic human instincts, societal expectations and 
organisational requirements will all combine to see first responders 
undertaking whatever tasks are necessary to preserve life and relieve 
suffering.  Plans must clearly account for basic realities and not 
assume that members of responding agencies will limit their activities 
solely to their responsibilities as laid down in formal written plans.  
The nature of emergency responders is such that if something needs 
doing, they will tend to get on and do it themselves if there’s no-one 
more suitable or better qualified on hand to undertake the task.
8. All information regarding the incident, casualties, 
etc. should ideally be channelled through one 
outlet, thus ensuring a comprehensive and 
accurate release of information at all times.
The vital importance of effective liaison between the ambulance 
service, hospitals and the Casualty Bureau has been demonstrated 
time and time again, particularly in establishing accurate casualty 
figures and nominating one agency as the ‘single source of 
truth’ with regard to the public release of those figures.
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Lessons Learned Remarks
9. Regular training of police, and supporting outside 
organisations, not only in their major incident 
procedures but also the background procedures of all 
other services, must be carried out and exercised if an 
incident is to be policed and co-ordinated successfully.
Anyone involved in the areas of civil protection, emergency 
management and resilience will recognise the continuing 
importance of this recommendation.  However, it is interesting to 
note one of C/Insp. Brian Fisher’s concluding remarks in the City 
of London Police’s official report into the Moorgate disaster:
“502. It is Force policy to ensure that all personnel, 
from the Commissioner downwards, receive training in 
the specialist duties and procedures that are required 
to be practiced at times of a major incident.
“503. One always hoped that the need to use such 
procedures never arises and thus students on courses, 
whilst basically acknowledging the apparent need for such 
training, tend to consider it rather a waste of their time.
“504. Over the years this outlook was slowly changing, especially 
following the Old Bailey incident in 1973.  It has been extremely 
gratifying to me to receive unending comments from all ranks 
of the Force to the effect that ‘… we all thought your training 
was a waste of time, but now realise that it is essential to the 
smooth running of the operation’  Perhaps the highlight of 
these comments was received from a Sergeant of the Force.  He 
is known to all personnel as one who has always found fault 
with various aspects of the service yet, on this occasion, he 
saw fit to walk from his Divisional Station to Headquarters 
and personally express his views of the operation.”
 
Fig. 8 (left): The scene outside Moorgate station during the first days of the emergency response – note in particular the co-location of the emergency services’ control 
units; and (right) C/Insp. Brian Fisher of the City of London Police wearing the ‘Police Incident Officer’ tabard alongside his ambulance service counterpart.
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Conclusion
In a paper24 presented in 1976, Chief Officer 
Joe Milner CBE of the London Fire Brigade 
commented that: “From the outset of the 
Moorgate operations, it was obvious that if 
a Staff College instructor had been assigned 
the production of a major accident scenario 
for a fire service exercise, this incident would 
have out-matched the demands of the most 
meticulous Commandant.”
He was undoubtedly right.  The 
unprecedented challenges presented by the 
incident severely tested the joint response of 
London’s emergency responders working in 
appalling conditions deep under the streets 
of the capital.  Their professionalism, skill, 
courage and determination saved many lives 
that day, brought comfort and reassurance 
to those who were trapped in the wreckage 
and demonstrated the best traditions of the 
emergency services to Londoners, to the 
country and to the rest of the world. 
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